We prove a set-theoretic version of Hájek, Paris and Shepherdson's theorem [HPS00] as follows: The set ω of natural numbers must contain a non-standard natural number in any natural Tarskian semantics of C L 0 (ω), the set theory with comprehension principle within Lukasiewicz's infinitevalued predicate logic. The key idea of the proof is a generalization of the derivation of Moh Shaw-Kwei's paradox, which is a Russell-like paradox for many-valued logic.
Introduction
In this paper we prove a set-theoretic version theorem of Hájek, Paris and Shepherdson's [HPS00] about the composition of the set ω of natural numbers. They worked within PA LTr 2 which is the arithmetic containing the axioms of PA and a truth predicate Tr within an extension of Lukasiewicz infinite-valued predicate logic. They proved that ω must contain a non-standard natural number in any natural Tarskian semantics which is a model whose truth set is [0, 1].
Our main theorem is that the statement which can be interpreted as "ω must contain a non-standard natural number" has truth value 1 in any natural Tarskian semantics of the weak Cantor-Lukasiewicz fuzzy set theory C L 0 (ω) defined by Hájek [Haj04] . The outline of the proof is as follows: We can define a Russell-like set R ω by a recursion theorem guaranteeing the existence of a set X defined in the form (∀x)x ∈ X ≡ ϕ(x, · · · , X) for any formula ϕ [Can03] . If ω consists of standard natural numbers, we can't assign the truth value for R ω ∈ R ω . The definition of R ω is a generalization of the sentence used in Moh Shaw-Kwei's paradox [Msk54] .
It has been pointed out that the behavior of the concept of set with the comprehension principle is similar to that of truth predicate within classical logic. Our theorem shows that the similarity becomes clearer within Lukasiewicz's infinite-valued predicate logic.
Preliminaries
In this paper we work within L∀, Lukasiewicz fuzzy predicate logic (with functions), formalized by Hájek [Haj01] . We introduce natural Tarskian semantics as in [HPS00] as follows:
for all variable y except possibly x}.
We note that, in [Haj01] , this is called a ([0, 1], * , =⇒, 0, 1)-structure M where ([0, 1], * , =⇒, 0, 1) forms the standard MV-algebra. We also note that T ϕ implies ϕ M = 1 holds, but the converse doesn't hold; the completeness theorem only holds for all MV-algebras.
Let C L 0 be the set theory within Lukasiewicz fuzzy predicate logic
• which has binary predicate ∈, and terms of the form {x : ϕ(x)},
• whose only axiom is the comprehension principle, for any formula ϕ,
Definition 2.4 ∅ is the term defined as {x : x = x}.
We note that Cantini originally proved the theorem within Grisȋn logic which is classical logic minus the contraction rule, and it is a subset of Lukasiewicz fuzzy predicate logic; for more details, see [Can03] . Using this recursion theorem, we can define a term which represents a set of all natural numbers as follows: Definition 2.6 ω is a term such that by
We define natural number n > 0 to be ∅ within n iterate of {}. Clearly it is consistent to add a new constant ω and the axiom for ω,
Hájek called it the set theory C L 0 (ω) [Haj04] . Now we consider the composition of ω. The recursion construction of ω cannot tell us what kind of elements ω consists of. We can easily show that ω contains any standard natural number (in fact this can be shown within GL; see [Can03] ). The next question is as follows: Is it possible that ω consists of only standard natural numbers? We will investigate it in the next section.
Hájek, Paris and Shepherdson's theorem
In this subsection we introduce Hájek, Paris and Shepherdson's theorem [HPS00] about the composition of ω. The framework is RPL∀ which is the extension of Lukasiewicz infinite-valued predicate logic formed by adding truth constantsr for each rational number r ∈ [0, 1]. Within the framework PA LTr 2 is the arithmetic with an added truth predicate Tr and axioms of PA (in this language) and "the dequotation axiom schema" ϕ ≡ Tr(φ) for any closed formula ϕ whereφ is its Gödel number.
Lemma 2.7 (Diagonal lemma for PA LTr 2 ) For any formula ϕ(x) with exactly one free variable, there is a sentence ψ such that PA LTr 2 ψ ≡ ϕ(ψ).
We inductively define a new connective × and the corresponding arithmetization× as follows. Proof. Assume otherwise. Then there is a model M which is an expansion of N. Using the above × and diagonalization, we can define the "modest liar formula" λ as follows:
The question is, what is the truth value of the sentence λ. Both λ M = 1 and λ M = 1 imply a contradiction. The solution is that there is a non-standard natural number m ∈ ω such that Tr(m×¬λ) M > 0 and λ M = 1. 2 3 A set theoretic paradox about non-standard numbers
In this section we investigate the composition of ω in C L 0 (ω). We produce the statement which can be interpreted as "the set ω must contain a non-standard natural number". And we show it has truth value 1 in any model of C L 0 (ω) by defining the Russell-like set by recursion.
First let us define an implication → m inductively: x ∈ x → 0 x ∈ x is x ∈ x and x ∈ x → i+1 x ∈ x is defined by x ∈ x → (x ∈ x → i x ∈ x) for any i < m. We recall that 0 = ∅ and n + 1 = {n} for any n ∈ ω. Formally, we define a term θ by
Claim 3.1 For any n ∈ N, n, x ∈ θ M = min{(n + 1)(1 − x ∈ x M ), 1}.
Next we produce the Russell-like set using the above θ as follows:
The question is, what is the truth value of the sentence "R ω ∈ R ω "?
Assume p = 1. Then there must be some j ∈ N such that j · (1 − p) ≥ 1, so p must be 1, a contradiction. 2
We note that n, R ω ∈ θ M = 0 for any n ∈ N. So the statement " n, R ω ∈ θ" can be interpreted as "n is a non-standard natural number", and "R ω ∈ R ω " can be interpreted as "there is a non-standard natural number". In this sense, we have the following theorem:
The statement which can be interpreted as "ω contains a non-standard natural number" has truth value 1 in any model of C L 0 (ω).
We remark that we can generalize the main theorem easily as follows:
Corollary 3.4 Let L be any Archimedean MV-algebra. Then the statement which can be interpreted as "ω contains a non-standard natural number" has truth value 1 L .
However our proof doesn't work for non-Archimedean MV-algebras, so we can't conclude "the statement is a theorem of C L 0 (ω)". In [Whi79] , White defined the weak implication ⇒. Intuitively it can be thought of as the infinite disjunction ϕ ⇒ φ ≡ (ϕ → φ) ∨ (ϕ → 2 φ) ∨ · · · . He remarked ⇒ distributes over Lukasiewicz implication →. We note that the analogue of ⇒ can be defined in C L 0 (ω) as follows: For any formula ϕ and ψ, we can define a term θ ϕφ by
And we can define the analogue ⇒ * by ϕ ⇒ * φ ≡ (∃n ∈ ω)n ∈ θ ϕφ . However the main theorem shows ⇒ * is not the same as ⇒. In C L 0 (ω) the recursion theorem can be rewritten as a theorem asserting the existence of the minimal fixed point of a monotone operator. Let us consider the construction of ω. Let S be the monotone operator such that S(X) = {x : x ∈ X ∨ (∃y ∈ X){y} = x}. Starting from the crisp set {∅}, we iterate the operator SSS · · · S({∅}). Eventually we arrive at the fixed point ω; it is guaranteed by the recursion theorem. However it might not be the least one. In any universe of ZF the least fixed point of the above S is just the set ω of all standard natural numbers. However in C L 0 (ω) ω must contain a non-standard natural number. We note that the fixed point might not be crisp even though we start from crisp sets.
The proof is just the generalization of the derivation of Moh Shaw-Kwei's paradox; the paradox is that the truth value of the sentence "R m ∈ R m " can't be decided within Lukasiewicz m-valued propositional logic, where
Intuitively R ω = m∈ω R m in this proof; the non-standard natural number exists to make C L 0 (ω) consistent.
We note that this theorem is a set-theoretic version of Hájek, Paris and Shepherdson's theorem. This theorem shows that if ω is crisp then we can guarantee the existence of the non-standard natural number. In the framework of HPS theorem, ω is supposed to be crisp; the results are just the same.
We point out there are two correspondences between these theorems. One is that θ in the previous proof and × in HPS theorem play the same role; the truth value is multiplied by them (see claim 2.9 and claim 3.1), and they make both R ω ∈ R ω and λ have the meaning of "I am at least a little false". Another is "self reference"; both λ and "R ω ∈ R ω " are defined circularly. λ is produced by diagonalization argument using induction, and R ω is by recursion. The comprehension principle plays the same role of coding any formula to some object as the arithmetization.
It has been pointed out that the concept of set given by the comprehension principle has the characteristic common to the concept of truth predicate introduced by the dequotation schema even in classical logic. For example, Russell's paradox brought about by the former concept is even identical to Grelling's paradox by the latter concept [Vis84] , and the most famous solution is "the iterative concept" which was called by Boolos. The another example is the truth theory suggested by Gupta and Belnap [GB93] . They suggested that the significance of truth has to be fixed by Tarski's T-biconditionals, i.e. p is true iff p holds. We can see the definition of truth by T-biconditionals is circular; let us consider the example "This sentence is true" is true iff this sentence is true. They insisted such a circularity enriches the expressive power of the concept of truth. And they pointed out Concepts with circular definitions behave in ways that are remarkably similar to the behavior of the concept of truth.
They assert that the comprehension principle provides one such concept because we can regard it as a circular definition of the membership relation ∈. For example, consider the case z ∈ {x : x ∈ x} ≡ z ∈ z which looks like a circular definition of ∈ and behaves like the "Truth Teller" sentence, i.e."This very sentence is true".
Within Lukasiewicz infinite-valued predicate logic, neither concept implies a contradiction. Our theorem highlights that the similarity between them.
